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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Bennett Scales appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his request for an overnight recess in his trial after the State rested its case at 
nearly four in the afternoon on the first day of trial, which was scheduled for two days. 
He based that argument on an analysis of several relevant factors identified in 
precedent. He also asserts that the denial of the requested recess infringed on several 
of his constitutional rights. 
The State responds, contending that the identified factors are not applicable in 
this case because the cases setting forth those factors were discussing a specific 
factual scenario that does not exist in Mr. Scales' case. It also asserts, 1Nithout 
argument or explanation, that there was no infringement of Mr. Scale's constitutional 
rights. Rather, it claims that Mr. Scales cited no authority to support his argument that 
his rights had been violated. The State's arguments are without merit. 
Mr. Scales responds to explain why the identified factors do apply, and how his 
constitutional rights were, in fact, violated, as demonstrated by the precedent cited in his 
Appellant's Brief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Scales' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion, promoting 
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for a 
eviscerated several of Mr. constitutional rights. 
2 
on 
in so doing, 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Promoting A Myopic Insistence On 
Expeditiousness In The Face Of A Justifiable Request For A Recess, And In So Doing, 
Eviscerated Several Of Mr. Scales' Constitutional Rights 
A. The Relevant Factors Identified In Precedent Guide The Analysis In This Appeal 
And Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Denying The Requested 
Recess 
Mr. Scales argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
request for a recess. In his Appellant's Brief, he relied on several factors discussed in 
precedent, notably those identified in State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546 ( 1993 ), and State v. 
Carman, 114 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 1988), which are relevant to an evaluation of whether 
the district court erred in denying a requested continuance. Specifically, those factors 
include: (1) the timing of the motion; (2) the requested length of delay, including 
whether the delay is an attempt to manipulate the proceedings; (3) the number, if any, 
of similar continuances sought by the defendant; (4) the inconvenience to witnesses; 
and (5) any prejudice to the prosecution. Pratt, 125 Idaho at 555-56; Carman, 114 
Idaho at 793. Those cases identified two other factors which were not relevant to the 
facts at issue in Mr. Scales' case: (1) whether there was an irreconcilable conflict 
between client and counsel, and (2) the qualifications of counsel to represent the client 
in the pending matter. Id. The State contends that, because the factual scenario in this 
case is not identical to the factual scenarios in Pratt and Carman, a "partial-application 
of Pratt and Carman absent a deprivation of the right to proceed with counsel of choice" 
is not justified. (Resp. Br., p.11.) Basically, it argues that those cases should be limited 
to the specific factual scenarios they addressed. 
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The State's position is untenable because have 
some, but not all, of those same factors in assessing decisions on motions 
for continuances. In each case, the courts considered only those factors relevant to the 
facts at issue. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "the trial court clearly 
focused on relevant reasons for either granting or denying the continuance," as it 
affirmed the denial of the motion to continue to allow adequate time to reform the 
defense strategy after one of the counts was dismissed on the morning of trial. State v. 
Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 707 (1993) (specifically considering the timing of the motion, 
the length of the requested delay, the inconvenience to witnesses, and the prejud to 
the prosecution) (emphasis added). And what the Idaho Supreme Court implied in 
Ransom about the propriety of assessing only the relevant factors, the Court of Appeals 
has recently and expressly held: "Thus, application of the described in 
Cag/e[1] is appropriate." State v. DeWitt, 153 Idaho 658, 664 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(considering the timing of the motion, the length of the proposed delay, and the 
inconvenience to witnesses to determine that there was no abuse of discretion in 
denying the motion for continuance to allow the defendant to obtain new counsel) 
(emphasis added). 
Those decisions are consistent with numerous other decisions where Idaho's 
appellate courts have considered claims regarding decisions on requests for 
continuances in cases that do not include requests for new counsel. Each decision was 
reached after consideration of several, but not all, of the same factors that were 
1 State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Where a defendant seeks new 
counsel, several factors are relevant .... Carman, 114 Idaho at 793, 760 P.2d at 1209. 
We examine these factors in turn."). 
4 
identified in Pratt and e.g., V. 1 Idaho 1, 22-23 (1998) 
(considering the number of prior requests for continuances in affirming the denial of the 
motion for continuance to allow for additional collection of evidence); State v. Averett, 
142 Idaho 879, 889 (Ct. App. 2006) (considering the timing of the motion, the fact that 
the defendant had made other motions for continuances, the inconvenience to 
witnesses, and the prejudice to the prosecution in affirming the denial of the motion for 
continuance to resolve a discovery dispute and allow for adequate trial preparation); 
State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 218-19 (Ct. App. 1998) (considering the timing of the 
motion and the inconvenience to witnesses in affirming the denial of the motion for a 
continuance to allow the defendant to subpoena witnesses who had already testified 
and been subject to cross examination); v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735, 737-38 
(Ct. App. 1997) (considering the length of the requested continuance and prejudice to 
the prosecution in affirming the grant of the State's motion for a continuance when a 
necessary witness suddenly fell ill)2; State v. Irving, 118 Idaho 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(considering the timing of the motion, and the fact that the request for a continuance 
was designed to manipulate the proceedings in affirming the denial of the motion for 
continuance to allow an untimely motion to suppress). While only a few of these 
decisions actually acknowledge the list of factors that has been articulated in Pratt and 
Carman, they all still considered the same factors, and those analyses were guided by 
the facts of the particular case. Therefore, as demonstrated by these cases, a partial 
application of the list of factors from Pratt and Carman is appropriate. 
2 In Wheeler, the Court of Appeals actually pointed out that the district court's 
determination that "a continuance of a few days" would be no more problematic than 
excusing the jury for a long weekend. Wheeler, 129 Idaho at 738. 
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That is, after all, how the doctrine of stare decisis works: "where the court has 
decided a question of law in another case and a like state of facts is subsequently 
presented, the rule of stare decisis applies .... " State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 441 
(1991) (emphasis added). The application of prior case law does not require the new 
case to present an identical factual scenario, just a similar factual scenario. In Pratt and 
Carman, as in Ransom and Mr. Scales' case, the question of law at issue is whether the 
district court erred in denying a request for a continuance. All four cases present similar 
factual scenarios - the defendant asked for a continuance of the trial so that he might 
receive effective assistance from trial counsel. The only factual difference is the 
underlying reason for the request for a recess or continuance. In Pratt and Carman, it 
was because the defendant had decided to hire a different attorney. Pratt, 125 Idaho at 
555; Carman, 114 Idaho at 792-93. In Ransom, it was because the State had 
dismissed one of the pending charges, and that action significantly altered the defense 
strategy. Ransom, 124 Idaho at 706. In this case, it was because Mr. Scales wanted to 
compose himself and finalize his strategy for his testimony in light of the evidence the 
State offered, rather than offer ad hoc testimony which risked prejudicing his case. 
(Tr., p.166, L.22 - p.167, L.2; Tr., p.170, L.4 - p.171, L.19.) Therefore, all these cases 
present a like state of facts, and so, the factors identified in Pratt and Carman, which 
inform the analysis on this question of law - whether the requested recess or 
continuance should have been granted - are applicable in this case. 
Considering the relevant factors identified in those prior decisions demonstrates 
why the district court abused its discretion in denying the requested continuance. (See 
App. Br., pp.5-8.) The State claims that the denial of that motion was justified because 
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granting it may have undue hardship on the prosecution and 
witnesses because there might have 
Mr. Scales' testimony. 
a need for rebuttal testimony following 
The State is mistaken in that conclusion. The burden of a potential need for 
rebuttal evidence existed from the outset of the trial. The trial was already scheduled to 
last two days and the request for the recess was made one hour before the close of 
business on the first day. Therefore, the proposed recess would not have created an 
additional burden that did not already exist for the witnesses or the prosecutor. As a 
result, the State's current contention does not justify the district court's decision to deny 
the recess. The district court's only justification for denying that request was that "this is 
the day set for trial, so we need to proceed." (Tr., p.169, Ls.9-10; see also Tr., p.-168, 
Ls.1 1; Tr., p.170, Ls.6-7.) As such, it improperly denied that justifiable request for an 
overnight recess based on a myopic, unreasoning, and arbitrary insistence upon 
expeditiousness in the face of a justified request for a recess, and so the decision to 
deny the recess was an abuse of discretion. Compare Pratt, 125 Idaho at 556; see 
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). 
B. The District Court's Decision To Deny The Request For A Recess Did Impact On 
Several Of Mr. Scales' Constitutional Rights 
Mr. Scales argued in his Appellant's Brief that the district court's denial of his 
request for a recess infringed on his right to testify in his own defense and his right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Part of the analysis in reviewing the decision to deny a 
motion for continuance is to determine whether that decision is so arbitrary as to violate 
the defendant's constitutional rights based on the facts and circumstances of the 
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particular as well as the rationales forwarded by the defendant in support of his 
motion, since, generally, absent a violation of his substantial rights, a defendant will not 
be prejudiced by a denial of a requested continuance. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589; 
State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446,449 (1973). 
The State makes two cursory points on this issue in its Respondant's Brief. First, 
it asserts that Mr. Scales has not presented any legal authority supporting his position 
that his constitutional rights had been infringed by the district court's denial of his 
request for a recess. (Resp. Br., p.12 ("He has failed to show otherwise, or to cite to 
any legal authority supporting his argument that a constitutional right was violated.") 
That is untrue. Mr. Scales cited some fourteen decisions from the United States 
Supreme Court and the Idaho appellate courts which support his analysis that the denial 
of the requested recess violated his constitutional rights. (See App. Br., pp.9-13.) The 
State does not present any substantial argument or analysis that contradicts Mr. Scales' 
analysis of that relevant case law. (See generally Resp. Br.) 
Second, it contends that his request to be more relaxed does not rise to the level 
of a constitutional violation, and so, his entire argument should be rejected. (See Resp. 
Br., p.12.) However, that assertion does not fairly represent the entirety of Mr. Scales' 
argument, since he also argued that, if a recess were not granted, he would not be able 
to get effective advice from counsel in order that he might provide meaningful testimony 
in his own defense. (Tr.,p.170, L.4-p.171, L.19.) The State offers no argument 
against the second half of Mr. Scales' argument. (See generally Resp. Br.) And, as it is 
the second half of Mr. Scales' argument which speaks directly to the violation of his 
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constitutional rights, the State's conclusory assertion that is no constitutional 
violation at issue in this case is also clearly wrong. 
Therefore, under the facts of this case, the district court's decision to deny the 
requested recess did infringe on Mr. Scales' constitutional rights. The United States 
Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the defendant has a right to testify on his 
own behalf, and the Idaho Supreme Court has added that the right to testify extends to 
allow thoughtful consideration with the advice of counsel in regard to that decision 
without substantial interjection by the court. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52-53 
(1987); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 763 (1988). The defense strategy in this case 
was centered around Mr. Scales' intent to offer testimony on his behalf. (Tr., p.165, 
Ls.1 Tr., p.84, L.6 - p.86, L.19.) However, Mr. Scales argued to the district court 
that, if the recess was not granted, he would not be able to give meaningful testimony 
(implying that he wanted to consider his options regarding his testimony, or the scope 
thereof, with his attorney). (Tr., p.170, Ls.4-13.) 
Such reassessments of the defense strategy are normal, since an effective 
defense team would want to make final decisions about its strategy in light of the 
evidence the State actually presented to the jury. The State argues that the defense 
had five months leading up to the trial to make those decisions (see, e.g., Resp. 
Br., p.12), but that assertion fails to consider that several of those decisions are 
necessarily contingent on the evidence the State actually offers during its case-in-chief. 
Therefore, a competent defense team will reassess its position, potentially adjusting its 
strategy, in response to the evidence actually presented by the State. (See App. 
9 
10-11 (discussing various considerations the team might 
the close of the case-in-chief).) 
To that point, Mr. Scales was only given five minutes to consult with counsel after 
the close of the State's case in which to receive any advice, and yet, at the same time, 
the district court also expected counsel to review the proposed final jury instructions. 
(Tr., p.167, L.16 - p.168, L.15.) Therefore, not only was there substantial judicial 
interjection by the district court which frustrated Mr. Scales' right to testify on his own 
behalf, which violated his Fifth Amendment rights, see Rock, 483 U.S. at 52-53; Aragon, 
114 Idaho at 763, that minimal amount of time to confer with counsel deprived 
Mr. of the effective assistance of counsel as well. e.g., Geders v. United 
States, U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that the preventing communications between a 
defendant and his attorney at a time "when an accused would normally confer with 
counsel" violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights); see also Perry v. Leeke, 
488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)) 
("'[The] Government violates the right to effective assistance of counsel when it 
interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions 
about how to conduct the defense,"' also noting that a defendant normally confers with 
his attorney after the State rests its case to make decisions about how to present the 
defense's case). 
Since the requested recess was appropriate and would have addressed these 
very issues, the decision to deny the requested recess violated several of Mr. Scales' 
constitutional rights. Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Scales' conviction as a 
result of the district court's erroneous denial of the request for a recess. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. respectfu I ly that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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